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TEACHING A NEW DOG OLD TRICKS: WHY THE HOWEY TEST IS 
STILL THE SEC’S BEST FRIEND WHEN EXAMINING INITIAL COIN 
OFFERINGS 
Laura Gritz* 
This Recent Development examines the state of the law and 
opinions surrounding whether an initial coin offering (ICO) 
constitutes an offering of securities under federal securities laws. 
The SEC has taken the position that each offering will be analyzed 
on a case-by-case basis, looking at the facts and circumstances of 
each offering. The number of ICOs has been expanding at an 
exponential pace, leaving regulators scrambling to decide whether 
these tokens are within the jurisdiction of a specific regulator, such 
as the SEC if they are securities, and how to apply existing law to 
this new market. If the ICO token is a security, it must comply with 
the applicable securities laws. If the SEC determines that the token 
is not a security, the company does not need to register the ICO 
under those securities laws. Both the issuers and the regulators need 
to understand what is expected of each other in order to create an 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Initial coin offerings” (ICOs) are becoming an increasingly 
popular form of raising capital for up-and-coming and established 
companies alike.1 A seemingly related variant of an initial public 
offering (IPO),2 ICOs present a similar opportunity for investors to 
cash in on a new type of asset.3 In exchange for an initial investment, 
both private and public investors are hoping to catch the start of the 
next wave of innovation.4 Contributing to this craze is the 
skyrocketing price of digital currencies such as Bitcoin, which fuel 
the idea that ICOs and coin offerings might parallel the dot-com 
boom.5 
Unlike an established company going public through an IPO, 
these companies are gathering contributions in the initial stages of 
                                                 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2019. The author 
would like to thank Professor Thomas Lee Hazen for his insightful views and 
suggestions on this developing topic, Christian Ferlan, Joseph Hjelt, Jordan 
Luebkemann, Erin Larson, and the rest of the Journal of Law and Technology 
staff for their incredibly helpful edits and feedback. 
 1 Investor Bulletin: Initial Coin Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 
25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-and-bulletins/ib_coinofferings 
[hereinafter Initial Coin Offerings]. 
 2 See generally Investor Bulletin: Investing in an IPO, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. 
COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ipo-investorbulletin.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2018) (giving an overview of considerations and information to 
help in IPO investing). 
 3 See, e.g., Jay Clayton, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial Coin 
Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov
/news/public-statement/statement-clayton-2017-12-11 (“The world’s social 
media platforms and financial markets are abuzz about cryptocurrencies and 
‘initial coin offerings’ (ICOs). There are tales of fortunes made and dreamed to 
be made.”); Trevor N. Cadigan et al., This Is What You Get When You Invest in 
an Initial Coin Offering, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 9, 2017), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/ico-initial-coin-offering-explained-bitcoin-
ethereum-2017-11; Denis Baranov, The New Blockchain Trend that Could 
Transform Business, FORTUNE (Oct. 18, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/10/18
/ico-cryptocurrency-coin-market-blockchain/. 
 4 See Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 1; Clayton, supra note 3. 
 5 See Izabella Kaminska, The Digital Currency Boom Echoes Dotcom Fever, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Sept. 8, 2017). 
APR. 2018] Teaching a New Dog Old Tricks 195 
development and using the funds to create products.6 In contrast to 
an IPO, where purchasing stock represents ownership in the 
company, investors in an ICO receive digital tokens created and 
issued by that company that may not represent an ownership 
interest.7 “Promoters may tell purchasers that the capital raised from 
the sales will be used to fund development of a digital platform, 
software, or other projects and that the virtual tokens or coins may 
be used to access the platform, use the software, or otherwise 
participate in the project.”8 Currently, these offerings are largely 
unregulated, though their popularity is attracting the attention of the 
SEC and other federal regulators.9 This rising concern for investors 
is leading to increased scrutiny of ICOs. Investors and regulators 
alike seek to ensure that companies issuing tokens deemed to be 
securities are either registered under the securities laws or estopped 
from continuing their unauthorized “fundraising.”10 
These coins can represent and accomplish a wide variety of 
products and functions. On one end of the spectrum, coins may be 
offered and purchased as an investment with the intent to make a 
profit.11 Other investors purchase coins with the intent to use them 
for the purpose for which they were developed.12 For example, 
consider a token that allows the investor access to a specific 
decentralized cloud storage program.13 Another ICO example is the 
creation of an app and token to allow users to interact in order to 
offset one user’s carbon emissions against the reduction in 
                                                 
 6 Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 1. 
 7 Id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 See, e.g., id.; Clayton, supra note 3 (“I have asked the SEC’s Division of 
Enforcement to continue to police this area vigorously and recommend 
enforcement actions against those that conduct initial coin offerings in violation 
of the federal securities laws.”). 
 10 See Clayton, supra note 3. 
 11 JUAN BATIZ-BENET, JESSE CLAYBURGH & MARCO SANTORI, THE SAFT 
PROJECT: TOWARD A COMPLIANT TOKEN SALE FRAMEWORK 9 (2017), 
https://saftproject.com/static/SAFT-Project-Whitepaper.pdf. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Josiah Wilmoth, ICO 101: Utility Tokens vs. Security Tokens, STRATEGIC 
COIN, http://strategiccoin.com/ico-101-utility-tokens-vs-security-tokens/ (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Wilmoth, ICO 101]. 
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another’s.14 Ultimately, the investor’s intentions and planned uses 
affect regulators’ legal characterization of the coin.15 
Much of the debate stems from attempts to characterize coins 
specifically with respect to whether the coins qualify as securities.16 
Absent any objective bright-line test to guarantee the status of these 
coins under securities laws, many developers are running into 
difficulties provoked by this uncertainty.17 Even if the issuers decide 
that their offering is likely to become a security at a certain point, 
they may not know exactly when.18 ICOs usually occur during early 
stages of a company’s development,19 and there is some debate as to 
whether the stage of development that the product is in can affect 
whether the federal securities laws will apply.20 If securities laws do 
apply, there are corresponding registration requirements that will 
increase time and costs.21 This is a result that the issuers would like 
to avoid; however, the disclosures would increase oversight and 
transparency for investors.22 The SEC has expressly avoided any 
                                                 
 14 Frequently Asked Questions, LIVING OFFSET, https://www.livingoffset.io
/faqs/index.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
 15 See generally Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The DAO, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 
117 SEC Docket No. 5, at 10–15 (July 25, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation
/investreport/34-81207.pdf [hereinafter The DAO] (explaining how the 
categorization of the type of token is based on different factors depending on the 
facts and circumstances of each case). 
 16 See, e.g., Clayton, supra note 3. 
 17 CARDOZO BLOCKCHAIN PROJECT, RESEARCH REPORT NO. 1, NOT SO FAST – 




 18 See BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 11, at 1516 (explaining how the authors 
believe that there is a strong likelihood that even if the token is a security before 
it becomes functional, once it becomes functional it no longer implicates 
securities laws). 
 19 See id. at 1. 
 20 Id. 
 21 See Fast Answers: Registration Under the Securities Act of 1933, U.S. SEC. 
& EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersregis33htm.html 
(last modified Sept. 2, 2011) (providing a broad overview of the registration 
requirements). 
 22 See id. 
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definitive conclusions as to what types of ICOs fall within the 
definition of a security, explaining that it depends on the facts and 
circumstances of each case, likely due to the varying nature of each 
token.23 
To determine how the law may allow room for a token as a 
security, it is useful to first examine how the definition of a security 
may be applied to encompass ICOs. Within the definition of a 
security, among the enumerated list of items such as stocks, notes, 
and bonds, is the term “investment contract.”24 In SEC v. W.J. 
Howey Co., the Supreme Court created the predominant test to 
determine whether a particular product or issuance falls within the 
“investment contract” enumeration, and is thus a security.25 The 
court defined the test of an investment contract as “whether the 
scheme involves an investment of money in a common enterprise 
with profits to come solely from the efforts of others.”26 The SEC 
currently applies the Howey test to evaluate ICOs against which it 
has brought enforcement actions.27 
The Howey framework is the most suitable test for the SEC to 
apply in determining whether the ICO at issue is a security. 
Although one of the predominant concerns of relying on this test is 
that it does not create clear boundaries for the developers, case law 
and SEC guidance will begin to form those lines over time.28 This 
subjective test is still the best option for maintaining enough 
flexibility to examine each unique token individually and on its own 
merits. It is important for the SEC to evaluate each offering on a 
case-by-case basis, as opposed to the comfort of a more objective 
and rigid rule with a clear, but in some cases inaccurate, application. 
Applying this test, it is likely that the SEC will find the majority of 
                                                 
 23 The DAO, supra note 15, at 1718; Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 1. 
 24 Securities Act of 1933 § 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2012). 
 25 See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
 26 Id. at 301. 
 27 Munchee Inc., Securities Act Release No. 10445, 118 SEC Docket No. 5, at 
2 (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2017/33-10445.pdf. 
 28 See The DAO, supra note 15, at 12 (explaining that the report was issued in 
the public interest to advise those who may use similar means of capital raising as 
to how to best ensure compliance with the securities laws). 
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the ICO tokens to be securities.29 Another factor for the SEC to 
weigh in its determination is the likelihood that the investor’s initial 
contribution will result in an ultimate loss due to the failure of the 
product.30 This consideration is called the risk capital test31 and will 
be discussed alongside the Howey test.32 
Part II of this Recent Development discusses the two primary 
types of coins to clarify what the deciding factors may be in 
determining whether a particular offering needs to be registered 
under the securities laws. Part III works through some key points 
defining what constitutes a security, considers why tokens are likely 
securities under the definition, and discusses some of the arguments 
taking the stance that a token is not a security. Part IV discusses why 
the subjective Howey33 test is still the best tool that the SEC has to 
analyze these ICOs. This will allow the SEC to look past the issuer’s 
surface label of the offering to determine whether they will be 
required to comply with federal securities laws. 
II. TYPES OF COINS 
There are two primary types of coins with two different 
functions.34 Utility coins, as the name indicates, are meant to 
function for a specific purpose.35 Most coins offered in an ICO are 
                                                 
 29 Daniel C. Zinman, James Q. Walker, Margaret Winterkorn Meyers 
& Whitney O’Byrne, SEC Issues Warning to Lawyers on ICOs, BLOOMBERG 
LAW (Feb. 23, 2018), https://www.bna.com/sec-issues-warning-n57982089230/. 
 30 See Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815 (1961). 
 31 Id. 
 32 In light of the complexity of this rapidly developing field, and in order to 
facilitate this work’s analysis, this Recent Development will largely generalize 
characteristics of tokens. As such, the conclusions drawn are not intended to be all-
encompassing, with respect to the hundreds of different types of coins and their 
purposes. Olga Kharif, Initial Coin Offerings on Record Pace Even with 
Crackdown, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 11, 2017, 12:40 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2017-12-11/initial-coin-offerings-on-record-pace-even-with-u-s-
crackdown; ICO Calendar, HYPE.CODES, https://hype.codes/ico-calendar (last 
visited Feb. 22, 2018). Rather, the discussions in this Recent Development consider 
that there are likely to be exceptions, and most statements will not apply fully to 
each token. 
 33 SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946). 
 34 BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 11, at 34. 
 35 Id. 
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purportedly utility coins as they have a specific use in mind outside 
of investment and offer no ownership rights in the company itself.36 
The other, less common, type of coin is security coins. Security 
coins are similar to stock in that they are purchased for investment 
and represent an interest in the company.37 As has been common in 
this blossoming area, cryptocurrencies are subject to some 
definitional overlap. There is some indirect debate about whether 
cryptocurrencies,38 such as Bitcoin, which function as a medium of 
exchange and payment, are a type of utility token or if they exist as 
their own category.39 There is extensive literature on these virtual 
                                                 
 36 Id. at 1. 
 37 Josiah Wilmoth, The Difference Between Utility Tokens and Equity Tokens, 
STRATEGIC COIN, http://strategiccoin.com/difference-utility-tokens-equity-
tokens/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2018) [hereinafter Wilmoth, Difference Between]. 
 38 The Financial Action Task Force defines “cryptocurrency” as: 
 
a math-based, decentralised convertible virtual currency that is protected 
by cryptography.—i.e., it incorporates principles of cryptography to 
implement a distributed, decentralised, secure information economy. 
Cryptocurrency relies on public and private keys to transfer value from 
one person (individual or entity) to another, and must be 
cryptographically signed each time it is transferred. The safety, integrity 
and balance of cryptocurrency ledgers is ensured by a network of 
mutually distrustful parties (in Bitcoin, referred to as miners) who 
protect the network in exchange for the opportunity to obtain a randomly 
distributed fee (in Bitcoin, a small number of newly created bitcoins, 
called the “block reward” and in some cases, also transaction fees paid 
by users as a incentive for miners to include their transactions in the next 
block). Hundreds of cryptocurrency specifications have been defined, 
mostly derived from Bitcoin, which uses a proof of-work system to 
validate transactions and maintain the block chain. 
 
FATF REPORT, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES, KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL 
AML/CFT RISKS, FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE 4 (June 2014), 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-
definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf.  
 39 Compare BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 11, at 3, 9, with GUIDELINES FOR 
ENQUIRIES REGARDING THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR INITIAL COIN 
OFFERINGS (ICOS), SWISS FINANCIAL MARKET SUPERVISORY AUTHORITY 3 (Feb. 
16, 2018) [hereinafter FINMA] (naming a list of three categories: Payment 
Tokens (synonymous with cryptocurrencies), Utility Tokens, Asset Tokens), and 
Matthew May, What to Consider in an ICO, FORBES (Nov. 21, 2017, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2017/11/21/what-to-
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currencies,40 and though they offer relevant and useful discussions, 
they are outside of the scope and have no bearing on the conclusions 
of this Recent Development. 
A. Utility Coins 
Utility coins are tokens purchased by investors for future use of 
an ecosystem or network of users being created by the developers.41 
For example, investors may purchase a token that will allow them 
to have access to a certain application, and thus the value of the coin 
comes from the ability to partake in its use.42 These uses can range 
from a social-media type of user integration43 to a more sophisticated 
platform that allows or requires users with the appropriate 
knowledge base to contribute to the underlying technology.44 Utility 
tokens, unlike stock, often do not convey ownership rights in the 
underlying enterprise upon purchase.45 As the Cardozo Blockchain 
Project explains: 
[t]he contours between investment and utility tokens are not well-defined 
at this point, but utility tokens are generally designed to offer a 
consumptive or functional utility, as opposed to an inherent opportunity 
for profit. Many utility tokens are integral to the functioning of a 
blockchain-based platform that creates a decentralized network and can 
represent, for example, membership or licensing rights, staking 
mechanisms, or incentivization systems.
46
 
As an illustration of a utility token, a public statement by the 
SEC uses an example of a token to participate in a book of the month 
                                                 
consider-in-an-ico/#3bba95de5c44 (distinguishing between coin and token, with 
both being cryptocurrencies but the coin being similar to cash as it is spent and 
token being used for a “utility in a specific blockchain platform”). 
 40 See, e.g., Mark Edwin Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs 
of Future Public Payments Law, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1493 (2016). 
 41 BATIZ-BENET ET AL., supra note 11, at 34. 
 42 Wilmoth, Difference Between, supra note 37. 
 43 See Munchee Inc., supra note 27 at 12 (explaining how the app was 
designed to allow users to post restaurant reviews and photos). 
 44 See Tezos Contribution Terms, TEZOS 2, https://www.tezos.ch/pages
/contribution-terms.html#contribution-terms (last visited Jan. 29, 2018) 
(requiring that the investor understand the intricacies of the blockchain system 
and plans to use the investment to participate in the network). 
 45 Wilmoth, Difference Between, supra note 37. 
 46 CARDOZO, supra note 17, at 2. 
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club.47 It concludes that a “token that represents a participation 
interest in a book-of-the-month club may not implicate our 
securities laws, and may well be an efficient way for the club’s 
operators to fund the future acquisition of books and facilitate the 
distribution of those books to token holders.”48 This example is 
followed by the conclusion that even though simple participation 
tracking and integration may be an acceptable use, ICOs have taken 
this example to the next level by creating an entire functional 
network with an investment in a “yet-to-be-built publishing house 
with the authors, books and distribution networks all to come.”49 The 
example is meant to highlight how many of these tokens are being 
created for use in a detailed network beyond a basic, single-use 
transaction. 
B. Security Coins 
Security, or equity coins, are those at the other end of the 
spectrum, and their issuance serves a function similar to the issuance 
of stock.50 There may be ownership rights in a future system, and the 
incentive to invest will have been driven by the expectation of 
profit.51 Strategic Coin describes equity tokens as: 
a subcategory of security tokens that represent ownership of an asset, 
such as debt or company stock. By employing blockchain technology 
and smart contracts, a startup could forgo a traditional initial public 
offering (IPO) and instead issue shares and voting rights over the 
blockchain. Additionally, a lender could create tokens that represent debt 
owned by the company, enabling loans to be bought and sold in a high-
liquidity environment.52 
One of the first ICOs that the SEC investigated was The DAO, 
an organization that issued DAO Tokens which were ultimately held 
to be securities.53 This security token has characteristics of stock and 
represents an interest in a company.54 The investors contributed 
                                                 
 47 Clayton, supra note 3. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Wilmoth, Difference Between, supra note 37. 
 51 See id.  
 52 Id. 
 53 The DAO, supra note 15, at 1. 
 54 Id. at 56. 
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funds in exchange for this new token.55 The DAO planned to use the 
funds to invest in different projects, and profits were to be returned 
to the investors in a form comparable to dividends.56 According to 
the SEC investigation report, the token offered the holder ownership 
and voting rights, and the promotional materials claimed that the 
owners would receive a return on their investment in the form of 
“rewards.”57 There was also a functioning and efficient secondary 
marketplace on which to trade these tokens.58 These stock-like 
characteristics led the SEC to classify DAO tokens as securities and 
issue an investigative report explaining their reasoning for doing 
so.59 
Security coins primarily fall within the scope of the securities 
classification, as it seems they are simply stocks or other investment 
tools in a different form.60 The tokens with these straightforward 
properties will not be analyzed further in this Recent Development. 
Instead, the tokens with characteristics comprising both security 
coins and utility coins will be discussed. For example, utility coins 
may exhibit characteristics of a security when people invest in utility 
coins not for their use as a currency, but rather in the hope that the 
success of the created product will allow them to trade the token for 
a profit.61 These utility tokens with features of a security will be the 
focus of this Recent Development because these are the flexible and 
sometimes ambiguous characteristics that the majority of tokens will 
have.62 
                                                 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 4–6. 
 57 Id. at 5–6. 
 58 Id. at 6. 
 59 Id. at 1. 
 60 Wilmoth, ICO 101, supra note 13. 
 61 See generally MUNCHEE INC., supra note 27, at 78 (explaining that the 
circumstances leading an investor to expect a profit from a token with utility 
contributed to the classification of the token as a security). 
 62 CARDOZO, supra note 17, at 2. The results of a study examining the rights 
that different utility tokens represent resulted in a finding that the majority offer 
access to an online platform. Id. The security features of these utility tokens will 
be discussed throughout this Recent Development, primarily concerning how they 
meet the Howey test factors. 
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III. WHY MOST UTILITY TOKENS ARE ALSO SECURITIES 
A digital token is not among the listed items in the definition of 
a security.63 Therefore, it would need to fall within the enumerated 
term “investment contract” to be considered a security.64 To 
determine whether an investment contract exists, the favored 
analysis is the Howey test.65 This test determines that an offering is 
an investment contract if there is (i) an investment of money, (ii) in 
a common enterprise, (iii) with an expectation of profits, (iv) solely 
from the efforts of others.66 
The ICOs discussed below all involve a capital contribution by 
investors.67 Therefore the first Howey factor is satisfied. The ICOs 
will also be part of a common enterprise with multiple investors 
contributing capital to the development of the product; thus the 
second factor is also satisfied.68 The third factor, whether there is an 
expectation of profits, is discussed first. Finally, the factor as to 
whether the expected profits come from the efforts of others will be 
addressed. After the factors in Howey are analyzed, the risk capital 
test is looked at as another useful consideration when weighing 
whether the token is an “investment contract” and thus a security. 
A. Expectation of Profits 
The Howey test looks at the intent of the investor to consider 
whether an individual investor or group of individuals likely had an 
                                                 
 63 Securities Act, Section 2(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018). 
 64 Id.; see also SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (creating a test to 
establish if an instrument is an “investment contract”). 
 65 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298–99 (holding that “an investment contract for 
purposes of the Securities Act means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a 
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely 
from the efforts of the promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the 
shares in the enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal 
interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise.”). 
 66 See id. 
 67 Initial Coin Offerings, supra note 1 (explaining how investors purchase the 
tokens during the ICO). 
 68 Id. 
204 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. [VOL. 19: 193 
expectation of profit in the ICO.69 Often, the sophistication and 
knowledge of the investor is a strong factor in weighing his or her 
intent.70 The analysis considers both the groups of potential investors 
that the developers are targeting and the ultimate investor in the 
initial offering.71 For example, if the product is a new blockchain 
ecosystem designed to help facilitate transactions, avoiding the 
issues that plague many of the current systems, investors in the 
product should be tech savvy and have a demonstrated interest in 
using the product itself.72 When applying the Howey test to a product 
that is technical in nature, such as this system, there is likely an 
inference that individuals with no knowledge of the practical 
application of the technology will be investing primarily for profit.73 
The test also accounts for the actions of the company issuing the 
tokens.74 If the issuer or issuing company targets investors with little 
to no background or experience in that specific product, it follows 
that the issuers assumed that those investors would invest with the 
expectation of profit instead of planning on using the product 
themselves.75 Developers touting high returns is an equally clear 
sign investors may become involved principally for that purpose, 
                                                 
 69 Munchee Inc., supra note 27, at 4, 67 (discussing how the investors could 
expect the value of the token to increase due both to their actions in participating 
in the ecosystem and the actions the company planned to take). 
 70 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300. 
 71 See Teague v. Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 988 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
timeshare interest led to an expectation of profit from investors when the shares 
were advertised in a way to lead to that expectation). 
 72 See TEZOS, supra note 44, at 23 (requiring that the investor understand the 
intricacies of the blockchain system and plans to use the investment to participate 
in the network). 
 73 See Howey at 299–300. 
 74 See Munchee Inc., supra note 27, at 56. 
 75 See Howey, 328 U.S. at 299–300 (“They are offering an opportunity to 
contribute money and to share in the profits of a large citrus fruit enterprise 
managed and partly owned by respondents. They are offering this opportunity to 
persons who reside in distant localities and who lack the equipment and 
experience requisite to the cultivation, harvesting and marketing of the citrus 
products. Such persons have no desire to occupy the land or to develop it 
themselves; they are attracted solely by the prospects of a return on their 
investment.”). 
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which will satisfy the third factor.76 If the other Howey conditions 
are also satisfied, the ICO is a security, and the issuers are required 
to register under federal securities laws.77 
The Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA), 
like many other regulators around the world, has been concerned 
with how best to approach ICOs.78 FINMA released guidelines in 
February 2018 that provided a framework for determining whether 
an ICO token would be considered a security.79 It took an approach 
that was similar to the expectation of profit prong in the Howey test, 
deciding that: 
[u]tility tokens will not be treated as securities if their sole purpose is to 
confer digital access rights to an application or service and if the utility 
token can actually be used in this way at the point of issue. In these cases, 
the underlying function is to grant the access rights and the connection 
with capital markets, which is a typical feature of securities, is missing. 
If a utility token additionally or only has an investment purpose at the 
point of issue, FINMA will treat such tokens as securities (i.e. in the same 
way as asset tokens).80 
These guidelines acknowledge that using a utility coin only for 
its purpose does not implicate securities laws.81 The concern is that 
there are virtually no situations, at least from what the SEC has seen, 
where utility coins have been restricted in use to the extent necessary 
to meet this requirement.82 FINMA’s statement—that if there is an 
additional investment purpose at the time of issue, the token will be 
treated as a security83—encompasses the majority of these tokens. It 
is difficult to state that everyone who invested in an ICO solely had 
an expectation of use, with no investment agenda whatsoever. If 
                                                 
 76 See Teague, 35 F.3d at 989 (holding that a timeshare interest led to an 
expectation of profit from investors when the shares were advertised in a way to 
lead to that expectation). 
 77 Id. 
 78 See, e.g., FINMA, supra note 39; Annaliese Milano, German Regulator 
Pledges ‘Precise’ Oversight of ICOs, COINDESK (Feb. 22, 2018), 
https://www.coindesk.com/german-regulator-pledges-precise-oversight-icos/. 
 79 FINMA, supra note 39. 
 80 Id. at 5. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Zinman, supra note 29. The SEC chairman has noted that he has yet to see 
an ICO that is not a security. Id. 
 83 FINMA, supra note 39, at 5. 
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read literally, a single purchaser who may have an inkling of an 
investment goal in the ICO, even if it is not the predominant factor, 
will cause the token to be treated as a security.84 From the statements 
seen thus far, this conclusion is consistent with the SEC’s findings.85 
The investment intent is taken into account in the expectation of 
profits prong of the Howey test and is now further established 
through a regulator’s official acknowledgement.86 These FINMA 
guidelines addressing ICOs may provide useful guidance to the SEC 
when the agency is creating appropriate regulations. 
1. Scarcity of the Product 
A consideration that has only garnered limited discussion is how 
the scarcity of the ultimate product affects the expectation of profit 
factor in the Howey analysis.87 For example, some commentators say 
that one of the draws of investors and speculators to Bitcoin is the 
fact that there is a limited quantity that will be issued.88 If there was 
an unlimited supply of Bitcoin, it is possible that the price would not 
be as inflated as it currently is.89 Supply and demand are likely 
playing a factor in that value, among other market forces.90 If the 
issuers of the ICO are aware of this fact, they could decide to 
artificially limit access to the product that the tokens represent in 
order to increase the price people are willing to pay for the token in 
                                                 
 84 Id. 
 85 See generally Munchee Inc., supra note 27 (explaining how the investors’ 
expectations of profits played a factor in the classification of the token as a 
security). 
 86 FINMA, supra note 39, at 5. 
 87 See Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 
CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 717 (2005). 
 88 Id. (explaining how the issuers and initial investors of an IPO could 
manipulate the price of stocks upward through limiting the supply and increasing 
the desire to purchase); R.A., New Money, ECONOMIST (Mar. 17, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2014/03/bitcoin. 
 89 R.A., supra note 88. The rapid price fluctuations of Bitcoin lend themselves 
to a conclusion that the prices are inflated at times, with a price of $4,358 on 
October 1, 2017, an increase to $19,458 on December 17, 2017, and then another 
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https://www.worldcoinindex.com/coin/bitcoin (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). That 
sharp fall was followed by another increase to $11,679 on February 20, 2018. Id. 
 90 R.A., supra note 88. 
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the secondary market.91 This limitation may be necessary if the 
ultimate product, drawing on the example of the blockchain 
ecosystem above, can only handle a certain amount of volume. If 
there is no such inherent limitation, and yet the ultimate access to 
tokens beyond just the initial ICO is limited, then one may conclude 
that decision as a strategy to create that inflated supply and 
demand.92 This is not inherently negative; it is simply an action that 
should be taken into consideration when using the Howey test to 
determine whether the issuers intended to create an expectation of 
profit. 
Consider a limited-edition watch released in high demand. The 
watch could be used exactly for what it was made for, to tell time, 
but many individuals would likely purchase it with the intent to hold 
it as an investment that will increase in value. If the same watch was 
mass-manufactured, the potential value is unlikely to be as high, and 
there would be more purchasers intending to use it simply to wear 
and tell time. 
The creators of Munchee Inc., and in turn MUN tokens, planned 
to use this supply and demand theory in practice.93 Munchee Inc. is 
an app-based company that focuses on restaurant reviews.94 The 
original function was to allow users to post reviews and photos of 
their meals.95 Once Munchee decided to develop the app further, it 
decided to raise the funds with an ICO.96 Ultimately, the SEC issued 
a cease and desist order against the company’s ICO of MUN tokens 
stating that they were a security and thus needed to comply with the 
relevant securities laws.97 
One of the many factors the SEC took into consideration in its 
decision to classify MUN tokens as a security was the company’s 
plan to increase the value of the token.98 The whitepaper that 
Munchee issued described several different actions the company 
                                                 
 91 Id. 
 92 Hurt, supra note 87, at 717. 
 93 Munchee Inc., supra note 27, at 4–5. 
 94 Id. at 1–2. 
 95 Id. at 2. 
 96 Id. at 2–3. 
 97 Id. at 1–2. 
 98 Id. at 8. 
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would take to increase the value of MUN tokens to benefit holders. 
One of those ideas included limiting circulation.99 The company 
planned to “burn” tokens (take them out of circulation) periodically 
after receiving them as payment for certain actions, thereby 
restricting the number in use.100 Munchee claimed that this “could 
potentially increase the appreciation of the remaining MUN tokens 
as the total supply in circulation reduces and as users would prefer 
holding their MUN tokens.”101 
2. Utility Coins as Memberships and the Secondary Market 
The Munchee promotional materials also discussed the plan to 
give access to a secondary exchange to allow the holders of MUN 
to partake in a market for the tokens.102 The value of utility tokens to 
the investors, beyond the use of the product alone, comes from the 
gain that they can realize by resale of the token on a secondary 
exchange.103 This adds an element that would not ordinarily be 
present in a traditional product being purchased for use.104 Utility 
tokens that are used to access a specific site or event may be 
comparable to a membership in a traditional sense.105 However, even 
if investors do plan to use the token and the rights associated with 
                                                 
 99 Id. at 4–5. 
 100 Id. at 1–2, 5. 
 101 Id. at 5. 
 102 Id. 
 103 Clayton, supra note 3 (“It is especially troubling when the promoters of these 
offerings emphasize the secondary market trading potential of these tokens. 
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them, in most situations, there is still an expectation of profit beyond 
a pure membership or purchase of a product.106 As FINMA 
explained in its guidelines, even if the token is purchased with an 
intent to use it for its utility, if there is still an expectation or intent 
to obtain a profit, then they should be considered a security token.107 
These secondary markets bring opportunities into play that may 
not otherwise exist. The SEC has issued information about the 
difference in pricing between the IPO price paid by initial investors 
and the price that was paid on the secondary market once the shares 
were resold: 
[t]here can be a large difference between the price of shares when 
purchased in an initial public offering (IPO) and the price for the same 
shares when they start trading in the secondary market (where previously 
issued stocks, bonds, and other securities are bought and sold) after the 
IPO. 
The pricing disparities occur most often when an IPO is “hot” or appeals 
to many investors. When an IPO is “hot,” the demand for the securities 
far exceeds the supply of shares. The excess demand can only be 
completely satisfied once trading in the IPO shares begins. This 
imbalance between supply and demand generally causes the price of 
each share to rise dramatically in the first hours or days of trading. The 
price often falls after this initial flurry of trading subsides.108  
This economic observation also ties in the scarcity of the product 
and the impact it has on pricing, as discussed in the previous section. 
There may also be some risk associated with the investment 
beyond what would come from the purchase of a standard, already 
operational membership. For example, as seen in a representative 
case, the Supreme Court of California determined that purchasing 
memberships to a country club before it was built, with the 
developers relying on the funding from the membership purchases 
                                                 
 106 Clayton, supra note 3 (“[C]ertain market professionals have attempted to 
highlight utility characteristics of their proposed initial coin offerings in an effort 
to claim that their proposed tokens or coins are not securities. Many of these 
assertions appear to elevate form over substance. Merely calling a token a ‘utility’ 
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being a security.”). 
 107 FINMA, supra note 39, at 5. 
 108 Fast Answers: Initial Public Offerings, Pricing Differences, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersipopricinghtm.html 
(last modified Sept. 6, 2011). 
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to continue construction, constituted a security because of the risk 
of the ultimate product not materializing.109 The Court decided that 
the memberships were investment contracts because there was a risk 
of the country club never taking form, even though the ultimate 
benefit was just the use of the facilities.110 Although the Court used 
a state test called the risk capital test—discussed further below—its 
goal of investor protection is in the same spirit as the Howey test.111 
Because ICOs, without a fully functional product at the time of the 
offering, carry this same risk, regulation is needed in order to protect 
investors.112 
Beyond this initial stage, once the country club is up and 
running, memberships can be purchased without that initial risk 
(setting aside the always-present possibility of the club going out of 
business). These types of memberships are not considered securities, 
so what is different about purchasing a token that allows the holder 
to have a similar type of “membership” or utility?113 The difference 
in many of these cases is that unlike memberships, the tokens are 
often liquid and sellable on a secondary exchange, potentially for a 
return on the initial investment.114 Many of the ICOs have tokens 
that can be transferred between parties, leading to an increased 
expectation of profit and making them look more like securities.115 
Weighing all of these considerations, the expectations of profits 
prong is likely satisfied for most ICOs. Therefore, if the final Howey 
                                                 
 109 Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, 55 Cal. 2d 811, 815 (1961). 
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factor discussed next is also satisfied, the ICO at issue will be 
considered a security. 
B. From the Efforts of Others 
In response to the uncertainties surrounding the classification of 
ICO tokens, the Simple Agreement for Future Tokens (SAFT) 
Project was created with a goal of providing a framework that an 
ICO could apply and conform to in order to ensure compliance with 
any securities laws.116 This is purportedly achieved by first using a 
contract between the developers and the accredited investors, which 
the creators of SAFT concededly designate as a security that 
requires compliance with securities laws.117 The creators of SAFT 
next determined that once the product is fully developed, the 
resulting functional utility tokens will not fall under the securities 
definition and therefore would not need to follow federal securities 
laws.118 This conclusion was reached by looking at the “solely from 
the efforts of others” prong in the Howey test.119 The idea is that once 
a token becomes functional, its success and profits no longer rely on 
the efforts of others, but rather are predominantly influenced by 
market forces outside of any individual’s control.120 
The Cardozo Blockchain Project’s analysis of SAFT concluded 
that the suggested framework could have undesired implications.121 
The Blockchain Project states that the framework could 
unnecessarily bring some pre-functionality tokens into the SEC 
purview, and could also keep tokens that should be securities, even 
though functional, improperly outside of regulations.122 Using this 
SAFT framework simplifies a complex issue, but potentially at the 
expense of accuracy.123 
The creators of the SAFT whitepaper believe that periodic 
updating of the already functional product is not sufficient to satisfy 
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the “from the efforts of others” prong.124 Even if that conclusion is 
accepted, the token value can still be derived from the efforts of 
others by looking at the exchanges they may be traded on.125 The 
tokens may even derive much of their value from the functioning of 
this exchange,126 as will be evaluated below. This conclusion as to 
the value the exchange provides has been addressed in the SAFT 
whitepaper.127 The authors explain “[w]hen a token purchaser resells 
a token on an exchange platform for more than the purchase price, 
it is not the exchange platform that created the price difference. To 
the contrary, the market is merely the venue where the token 
purchaser executes the sale.”128 The whitepaper also cites cases 
determining that forward contracts from gold and silver did not meet 
the Howey test requirements “because profits to the coin buyer 
depended primarily upon the fluctuations of the gold market, not the 
managerial efforts of others.”129 However valid these points may be, 
they do not adequately weigh the necessary influence of functioning 
markets in maintaining the value of something like a digital token.130 
In most cases, the markets are an essential tool in allowing the 
profits to be realized.131 
Some commentators debate that gold and silver are different 
than tokens in that there is inherent value in these commodities, 
whereas a token is simply intangible code.132 An alternative 
conclusion is that it is the willingness and ability of others to give 
value in exchange for the precious metals that gives them their 
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worth.133 The same can be said about digital tokens. Without an 
exchange platform to trade these tokens on, the value would be 
linked and limited to the effort that individuals would have to put 
into finding direct buyers.134 This would severely hinder the 
feasibility of having free exchanges that properly reflect market 
value, and, in turn, profits could suffer.135 Hence, the managerial 
efforts of others in keeping the exchange running smoothly in order 
to facilitate the buying and selling of tokens is essential to creating 
profits,136 and if a token can be traded on an exchange, it would likely 
meet this fourth and final “from the efforts of others” aspect of the 
Howey test. 
C. The Risk Capital Test 
As discussed earlier, in Silver Hills Country Club v. Sobieski, the 
Supreme Court of California applied the risk capital test in 
determining whether solicitations for purchases of a country club 
membership, before the country club was built, and of which the 
capital would be used to build the club, constituted a security 
offering.137 The court decided that the memberships did constitute a 
security under the risk capital test because the: 
[p]etitioners [were] soliciting the risk capital with which to develop a 
business for profit. The purchaser’s risk is not lessened merely because 
the interest he purchases is labelled a membership. Only because he risks 
his capital along with other purchasers can there be any chance that the 
benefits of club membership will materialize.138 
Frequently, ICOs seek capital from investors in order to build 
their product.139 Often, the investors are taking a risk in hopes that 
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the product will ultimately succeed, without a guarantee of 
recovering their investment.140 It is likely that under both the risk 
capital test and the Howey test, this would constitute a security. 
Securities laws were enacted to protect investors, and a transaction 
such as a country club membership is a prime example of a situation 
that should require disclosures.141 This allows investors to make an 
informed decision about whether or not to participate in a particular 
investment opportunity.142 Even though their ultimate “profit” may 
not be monetary, they are still risking their capital with the 
expectation of an ultimate material benefit, in this case a 
membership at a constructed and functioning club.143 Currently, the 
risk capital test is most commonly used by state courts,144 but 
perhaps it would be a valuable tool for the SEC to use in determining 
whether a particular ICO is posing a risk to investors and thus, 
whether the ICO is likely to fall under one of the regulatory schemes. 
The Cardozo Blockchain Project has addressed the risk capital 
test in its response to the SAFT Project whitepaper.145 The authors 
explain how applying an analysis of the underlying risk of failure of 
a budding company or product would implicate scenarios beyond 
what securities laws are designed to regulate, using as examples 
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crowdfunding for the creation of a new product or the preorder of a 
Tesla car.146 What their response briefly mentions is how the risk 
capital test is not determinative, but rather only a factor taken into 
consideration when looking at the facts and circumstances.147 The 
application of the risk capital test as a supporting factor instead of a 
determinative element helps abate their concern of too much 
inclusivity. The Project is concerned with a potential application of 
the risk capital test on its own.148 However, it may be a useful 
consideration for the SEC in addition to the full application and 
analysis of the Howey test. Any use of the risk capital test should be 
another supplemental factor beyond the four Howey factors, as it is 
too broad of a test to apply individually. 
IV. HOW THE SEC HAS ADDRESSED ICOS 
Any tokens that do meet the four Howey test requirements are 
likely to be considered securities by federal regulators.149 However, 
few decisions applying the Howey test exist, making it difficult to 
predict which factors are most determinative.150 The SEC has 
recently issued public statements and investigative reports intended 
to make this analysis more transparent.151 One of the first 
investigations from the SEC into The DAO led the SEC to publish 
a report that they hoped would give guidance and considerations for 
future issuers.152 This insight provides a valuable look into the SEC’s 
application of the Howey test; however, this one scenario is unlikely 
to provide enough for uniform application to other unique offerings. 
Until more factors are discussed by the SEC, there may be issuers 
without an example of an adequately parallel comparison to their 
own product. 
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This lack of a bright line standard as to what type of token 
requires SEC registration is likely to leave many issuers 
uncomfortable. The registration requirements are burdensome, 
costly, and time intensive.153 Issuers would prefer to avoid having 
additional obligations resulting from their ICO falling within the 
scope of the federal securities laws.154 However, avoidance of the 
registration requirements is likely to trigger SEC compliance 
actions.155 The issuers need to weigh the cost of compliance with the 
chance that the SEC may decide that their ICO is outside of their 
purview. The issuers may take their chances and not register their 
ICO to save time and money.156 However, if the gamble does not pay 
off it could end up costing them much more.157 For example, in an 
emergency action against a fraudulent ICO touting the promise of 
exceptional profits: 
[t]he SEC’s complaint charge[d] [the issuers and others involved in the 
offering] with violating the anti-fraud provisions, and . . . the registration 
provision, of the U.S. federal securities laws. The complaint s[ought] 
permanent injunctions, disgorgement plus interest and penalties. [T]he 
SEC also s[ought] an officer-and-director bar and a bar from offering 
digital securities . . . .”158 
Despite the difficulties the test may present in token offerings 
with ambiguous characteristics, the subjective Howey test is still the 
appropriate analysis to apply due to the wide variety and functions 
of these tokens.159 A new bright-line test is unlikely to account for 
the multitude of differences among the tokens, particularly because 
there will always be exceptions to a rigid rule due to the wide variety 
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and functions of the tokens. Despite this, there have been, and will 
continue to be, attempts to create a test that issuers can use to help 
alleviate some of the uncertainty.160 There may be some applicable 
suggestions that result from this continued refining process; 
however, it seems unlikely that courts will create a more objective 
test that maintains the flexibility and personalization provided by the 
Howey approach.161 The flexibility the Howey factors offer is 
imperative for these fluid and unique offerings. 
Developers may have a sense of whether their offering 
constitutes a security.162 Nonetheless, they could be trying to use this 
industry uncertainty to claim that they did not realize that it would 
be considered as such, thus explaining why they did not register.163 
Importantly, just because something is called a security does not 
mean that it is, and vice versa, despite what the issuers may claim.164 
The SEC will look beyond the issuer’s decision regarding whether 
or not their token is a security to instead define the “economic 
reality.”165 The economic reality is what the underlying function and 
properties of the product resemble when compared to other devices, 
such as how it is similar to stock, and not just what it purports to be 
by label.166 Despite SAFTs best intentions, the Howey test will likely 
still need to be applied in order to determine whether an ICO’s 
designation is correct. 
For instance, in a cease and desist order against Munchee Inc., 
the SEC worked through the Howey test to demonstrate that the 
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tokens were a security, even though Munchee claimed that they had 
run through the test themselves and determined the tokens were 
not.167 The expectation of profit test was clearly met, with the SEC 
issuing a press release stating that: 
[a]ccording to the [SEC’s cease and desist] order, in the course of the 
offering, [Munchee Inc.] and other promoters emphasized that investors 
could expect that efforts by the company and others would lead to an 
increase in value of the tokens. The company also emphasized it would 
take steps to create and support a secondary market for the tokens. 
Because of these and other company activities, investors would have had 
a reasonable belief that their investment in tokens could generate a return 
on their investment.168 
These actions easily fit within the Howey framework, which is 
likely why the SEC took the stance that the ICO was a securities 
offering and ordered the company to return the funds to the 40 
investors it had gathered, notably within the first couple hours of the 
offering.169 
Moreover, in the order, the SEC explained that 
[e]ven if MUN tokens had a practical use at the time of the offering, it 
would not preclude the token from being a security. Determining 
whether a transaction involves a security does not turn on labelling . . . 
but instead requires an assessment of “the economic realities underlying 
a transaction.”170 
The recently issued FINMA guidelines parallel some reflections 
of the SECs statements on ICOs.171 The guidelines mention the need 
to take a flexible approach that looks at ICOs on a case-by-case 
basis.172 Like the SEC, FINMA states that “[it] will base its 
assessment on the underlying economic purpose of an ICO, most 
particularly when there are indications of an attempt to circumvent 
existing regulations.”173 
                                                 
 167 Munchee Inc., supra note 27, at 34. 
 168 SEC Press Release, Company Halts ICO After SEC Raises Registration 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The SEC has its hands full as the number of ICOs continues to 
rise.174 With the community of developers and issuers wanting clear 
guidelines and investors wanting assurance that the tokens they are 
contributing to are following applicable laws, there may be 
increased pressure to come up with bright-line tests. Unfortunately, 
with the crackdown just beginning, courts have had insufficient time 
to issue enough opinions to provide a template for the parties 
involved.175 The SEC has repeatedly said that they are going to look 
at each ICO on a case-by-case basis, and that is likely the best 
answer at the moment.176 This wave of innovation needs a flexible 
approach, and at the same time needs a tough analysis to protect 
investors and the public from fraudulent or overly risky (at least 
without the known risks) offerings.177 The proposed frameworks 
have their merits, but they would also likely create issues that 
otherwise would not exist with subjective examination.178 
With regulators discussing the need to create regulations 
specifically to address ICOs, this is an opportune time to cement the 
basic analysis of the Howey test as the universal test in ICO 
inquiries.179 Though this initially would seem to create an 
insurmountable issue of scope for concerned issuers hoping for clear 
guidelines, this should not be a deterrent from having a factor-based 
regulation. Guidance will continue to be issued over time, and once 
the prominent players such as the federal regulators and courts are 
on board, the industry should begin to settle. Though the Howey 
factors will be applied in the same manner in each instance, the 
multitude of token characteristics should eventually be analyzed and 
weighed as to whether they classify the token as a security or not. 
This will provide valuable insight to new developers as they are 
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considering how the SEC will weigh their tokens’ qualities.180 For 
the tokens that have unique characteristics that have not yet been 
addressed, the flexible framework will become a valuable tool 
instead of a hindrance. 
There needs to be a balance of efficiency and accuracy, and the 
Howey test has proven capable thus far of accomplishing both. Once 
additional case law and decisions by the SEC are released, the 
ambiguity concerns should be relieved. For now, the developers 
need to take an honest look at the token to decide whether it could 
rationally be seen as a security, as that will be the side that the SEC’s 
decisions will err on moving forward.181 
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